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HABEAS AS FORUM ALLOCATION:   
A NEW SYNTHESIS 
Carlos M. Vázquez* 
 The scope of habeas relief for state prisoners, especially during the decades 
before the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen, is a famously 
disputed question – one of recognized significance for contemporary debates 
about the proper scope of habeas review.  This Essay provides a new answer.  
It argues that, until the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, state prisoners were 
always entitled to de novo review of the legal and mixed law/fact questions 
decided against them by the state courts.  Until 1916, such review was 
provided by the Supreme Court; after 1953, such review was provided by the 
lower federal courts via habeas.  The situation between 1916 and 1953 was 
murkier.  This Essay shows that this was a transitional period marked by 
disagreement among the Justices as to the appropriate federal forum to review 
state court decisions resulting in custody.  At the beginning of this period, a 
majority of Justices continued to insist that the responsibility rested with 
Supreme Court.  Towards the end of this period, the Court shifted this 
responsibility to the habeas courts as a majority of Justices came to recognize 
that the Court could no longer hope to monitor state court criminal convictions.  
The Justices during this period agreed that federal review of state court 
convictions was necessary but disagreed about which federal court should 
provide such review.   The scope of habeas jurisdiction during this period, as 
before and after, reflected the Justices’ views about the proper allocation of 
jurisdiction among federal courts to review the state courts’ decision of 
constitutional questions arising in criminal cases resulting in custody. 
 In Brown v. Allen, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court held that  
federal courts adjudicating the habeas petitions of persons convicted of 
crimes in state court should apply a de novo standard of review with 
respect to issues of law and of application of law to fact.1  This standard 
of review prevailed until the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor 
interpreted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I am grateful for helpful 
comments from Ruthanne Deutsch, Stephen Goldblatt, Tara Leigh Grove, Vicki Jackson, 
Victoria Nourse, Michael Seidman, and Mark Tushnet.  I am also grateful for research 
assistance from Daniel Emam and Dani Zylberberg, and to Thanh Nguyen and his 
colleagues at Georgetown’s Edward Bennett Williams Law Library for the research 
reflected in the Appendix. 
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(AEDPA) as establishing a standard of review more deferential to state 
courts.2   Whether Brown’s de novo standard was a departure from the 
standard the courts had previously applied in habeas cases is a famously 
disputed question.  In an influential article, Professor Paul Bator argued 
that the Court in Brown broadly expanded the availability of habeas relief 
to state prisoners, an expansion that he criticized as undesirable as well as 
unprecedented.3   Before Brown, he argued, the federal courts properly 
declined to grant habeas relief to state prisoners unless the state court had 
failed to provide a full and fair hearing of the petitioner’s constitutional 
claim.4  In Professor Bator’s view, the limited scope of federal habeas 
review meant that the state courts often had the final word regarding the 
federal constitutional rights implicated in state criminal proceedings.  This 
view was disputed by Justice Brennan, who, in Fay v. Noia, maintained 
that habeas courts had always provided plenary review of state prisoners' 
fundamental rights.5  Justice Brennan’s version of the history was 
defended at some length by Professor Gary Peller.6   
 More recently, Professor James Liebman has offered a third version 
of the pre-Brown history, arguing that both Professor Bator, on the one 
hand, and Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, on the other hand, had 
gotten parts of the history wrong.   According to Professor Liebman, the 
habeas statutes always authorized de novo review of constitutional issues 
decided by the state courts, but only “where the writ is the only effective 
means of preserving [the petitioner’s] rights.”7   During the Nineteenth 
Century, habeas was almost never necessary for this purpose, as any 
person convicted in the state courts had a right to Supreme Court review 
of any federal questions decided against her by the state courts.  When 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction became discretionary, however, 
the lower federal court’s habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap, the 
writ then being the only effective means of preserving the constitutional 
rights of state prisoners.8   In Professor Liebman’s telling, federal review 
 
2 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
3 Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 441, 499–507 (1963).  
4 Id. at 463–64.  
5 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963).   
6 Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
579 (1982). 
7 James Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: the Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct 
Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2055 (1992) (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 
101, 105 (1942)). 
8 See id. at 2075. 
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of state court criminal convictions was always available, but the forum 
responsible for providing such review shifted in the early part of the 
Twentieth Century.  
Although Professor Liebman did not use the term, he argued 
essentially that the Court’s rules addressing the scope of habeas review 
served a forum-allocation function:  they allocated among federal courts 
the responsibility for monitoring the state courts’ protection of the 
constitutional rights of state criminal defendants.9  Before the shift, the 
Supreme Court was responsible for providing such review; afterwards, the 
lower federal courts were responsible for doing so.  At no point were 
state prisoners’ constitutional rights relegated to the state courts without 
de novo federal review, as Professor Bator had argued.10 
 This Essay offers a fourth version of the pre-Brown history, bridging 
in some respects the other contending versions.  The pre-Brown cases 
show that Professor Liebman is right about the reason for the Twentieth 
Century expansion of the availability of habeas review for state prisoners.  
De novo federal court review of state criminal convictions was available 
throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.  Until 1916, state 
prisoners (like all state court litigants) had a right to review in the U.S. 
Supreme Court of any federal issue decided against them. Before 1867, 
the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction generally did not even extend to 
state prisoners. After that date, the Court articulated and enforced a rule 
under which the habeas courts were generally to deny relief to state 
prisoners convicted of crimes in state courts, the rationale being that 
direct review in the Supreme Court was available as of right and should 
ordinarily be pursued.  Professor Liebman is correct to note that the rule 
requiring federal habeas courts to stay their hands fell away in direct 
 
9 All rules of federal jurisdiction are "forum allocating" in the sense that they distribute 
judicial power between federal and state courts.  I use the term to describe the distribution 
of judicial power among federal courts.  This sense of the term can be traced to Vicki C. 
Jackson’s thesis that the Eleventh Amendment serves a forum-allocation function by 
allocating the power to enforce the federal obligations of the states between the Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1, 14–15, 74 (1988).  The Supreme 
Court rejected the forum allocation understanding of the Eleventh Amendment in Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, 
and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927 (2000); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L. J. 1683 (1997). 
10 Liebman, supra note 7, at 2080 (“[F]ollowing the certiorarification of the Court's 
direct appellate docket, the Court's inability to satisfy by itself the federal courts' statutory 
obligation to conduct review as of right, according to those principles, of the 
constitutionality of state detention thrust the obligation on the lower federal courts on 
habeas corpus.”).  
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response to the Supreme Court’s renunciation of the error-correction role 
it had previously fulfilled.   
But Professor Bator is closer to being right regarding the timing of the 
expansion of habeas jurisdiction.  Professor Liebman dates the shift from 
direct review in the Supreme Court to de novo review in the habeas 
courts to the Court’s 1915 decision in Frank v. Magnum.  Although the 
first statute replacing (some of) the Court’s mandatory writ of error 
review with discretionary writ of certiorari review was enacted in 1916, 
Professor Liebman argues that Frank responded to an unofficial 
“certiorarification” of direct review that preceded the formal 
certiorarification beginning in 1916.   
But the pre-Brown cases tell a somewhat different story. Well after the 
1916 amendments to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the 
Court continued to recite and apply the restrictive standards it had 
applied before the amendments.  As I show in this Essay, the cases show 
that, long after the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over state court 
judgments became formally discretionary, the Court continued to regard 
itself as the appropriate forum for review state criminal convictions.  It 
realized only gradually that it could not hope to perform an error-
correction function, and only then did it finally abandon the pre-1916 
limits on habeas review of state criminal convictions.   
In particular, this Essay shows that the years between 1916 and 1953 
were a transitional period characterized by disagreement among the 
Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas review.  The Justices 
agreed that meaningful federal review of state criminal convictions was 
necessary, but they disagreed about whether such review should take 
place in the Supreme Court on direct review or in the lower federal courts 
via habeas corpus.   Some Justices believed strongly that, in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances, only the Supreme Court should undertake 
the sensitive task of reviewing state court convictions and potentially 
setting free a person whose conviction had been upheld by the highest 
state court.  In the view of these Justices, the Court should continue to 
perform an error correction function in exercising its discretionary 
certiorari jurisdiction over state criminal convictions.  Other Justices 
believed that the lower federal courts were better situated to perform 
such review via habeas corpus.  The latter view gradually came to prevail 
as the Justices came to realize that they could no longer feasibly fulfill an 
error-correction function.  Brown v. Allen confirmed this shift in 1953 by 
holding both that the habeas courts should no longer regard a denial of 
certiorari as reflecting the Court's views on the merits of a state criminal 
defendant’s legal claims and that the habeas courts should review 
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo. 
	 6/20/16		10:34	AM	
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 In sum, although the cases tend to support Professor Bator’s story 
insofar as the timing of the expansion of habeas review is concerned, they 
also show that he was wrong about the reason for the restricted 
availability of habeas relief in the decades before the Brown decision.   At 
no point did the Court relegate state prisoners to the state courts for the 
protection of their constitutional rights.  The need for broad federal 
review of state criminal convictions was recognized throughout.  The 
narrow scope of review in the decades after 1916 was based on the 
Court’s continuing conviction that, despite the newly discretionary nature 
of its appellate jurisdiction, it alone should be the federal forum reviewing 
and possibly reversing state criminal convictions.  The loosening of the 
restrictions on the lower courts’ exercise of their habeas jurisdiction was 
based on the Court’s gradual realization that it could no longer hope to 
monitor state court decisions resulting in custody. This realization led the 
Court to conclude that the writ of habeas corpus was the only effective 
means of preserving the constitutional rights of state prisoners.  Although 
some pre-Brown cases included language or reasoning foreshadowing the 
shift, the first clear articulation of the de novo standard came in Brown v. 
Allen.   
 The pre-Brown history of habeas corpus has potentially important 
implications for current debates about the scope of habeas relief for state 
prisoners. In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas relied on Professor Bator’s 
claim that Brown’s standard was aberrational in urging a return to a more 
deferential standard.11  Justice O’Connor, for her part, relied on Justice 
Brennan’s history in arguing that any change in the standard should come 
from Congress.12  The new understanding of the pre-Brown defended here 
exposes as unprecedented Justice Thomas’ proposal to narrow the scope 
of habeas review without correspondingly broadening the availability of 
direct review in the Supreme Court.    
In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress amended the statute 
governing habeas relief for state prisoners, and a slim majority of the 
Court in Williams v. Taylor held that Congress had adopted Justice 
Thomas’ deferential habeas standard.13  Specifically, the Court held that, if 
the prisoner’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits in the 
state courts, the habeas court may not grant relief merely because the 
state court’s decision was erroneous; it may grant relief only if the state 
court’s error was unreasonable.14  In other words, AEDPA (as interpreted 
 
11 505 U.S. 277, 285–87 & n.3 (1992).  
12 Id. at 297–299 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
13 529 U.S. 362, 410–11 (2000). 
14 Id. at 412–13.  For elaboration, see Carlos M. Vázquez, AEDPA as (Dysfunctional) 
Forum-Allocation Rule (on file with author). 
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in Williams) replaces the de novo standard of review with a standard 
requiring the habeas courts to deny relief to state prisoners in custody 
pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court decisions.  If so, then 
AEDPA consigns erroneously convicted state prisoners to continued 
imprisonment (or even execution).  
The long history of treating habeas as a forum allocation device– as 
detailed in this Essay – suggests an alternative understanding of AEDPA.  
AEDPA does not limit the Supreme Court’s power to review and reverse 
wrong but reasonable state court decisions resulting in custody.  Indeed, 
the statute’s sponsors believed that Congress lacked the constitutional 
power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state 
criminal convictions.15  The Court’s long-standing treatment of habeas 
and direct review as alternative mechanisms for providing the necessary 
federal review of state criminal convictions invites an interpretation of 
AEDPA as shifting back to the Supreme Court the responsibility for 
monitoring state court decisions and granting relief for wrong but 
reasonable state court convictions.  
At the same time, the Court’s reasons for shifting the   responsibility 
for monitoring state court convictions to the lower federal courts exposes 
the highly dysfunctional nature of AEDPA if understood as a forum-
allocation device.  The reasons that drove that shift are just as applicable 
today as they were in 1953.  The Court is in no better position to fulfill an 
error-correction role with respect to state criminal convictions today than 
it was then.  If anything, allocating such a role to the Supreme Court 
would be even more dysfunctional today than it was in 1953. 
 I develop and critique the forum-allocation reading of AEDPA  
elsewhere.16   This Essay details the long history of treating habeas for 
state prisoners as allocating among the federal courts the power and 
responsibility for safeguarding the constitutional rights of persons 
convicted of crimes in state court.  I show that, before Williams, de novo 
federal review of legal and mixed questions decided by the state courts in 
cases resulting in custody was always understood to be necessary and that, 
between 1916 and 1953, the debate was not about whether state 
prisoners' constitutional claims should be relegated to state court; it was 
instead about whether federal review should be undertaken in the 
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts.  The Court eventually 
concluded that it could not hope to monitor state court compliance with 
the constitutional rights of state court criminal defendants and 
accordingly expanded the lower federal courts’ power to do so via habeas. 
 
15 141 CONG. REC. S7833 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
16 See Vázquez, supra note 14. 
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In Part I, I examine the period between the Founding and 1916, 
when Congress amended the statute governing the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction over cases from the state courts, replacing its mandatory writ 
of error jurisdiction with discretionary writ of certiorari jurisdiction.   
Until 1867, the habeas jurisdiction of the lower federal courts did not 
generally extend to state prisoners.  During this period, state prisoners 
were entitled to de novo review in the Supreme Court of legal and mixed 
questions of federal law decided against them in the state courts.   Even 
after Congress extended the lower federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to 
state prisoners, the Court interpreted the jurisdiction narrowly, channeling 
such cases to the Supreme Court.  During this period, the Court regarded 
direct review as the proper mechanism for ensuring state court protection 
of the constitutional rights of persons convicted of crimes in state court. 
In Part II, the heart of the Essay, I examine the period between 1916 
and the Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen.  I show in this Part that 
this was a transitional one marked by disagreement among the Justices 
about whether the responsibility for monitoring state court decisions 
resulting in custody should be allocated to the Court itself or to the lower 
federal courts on habeas.  The evolution of the Justices’ views on this 
question is reflected mainly in the decisions that gradually rejected the 
doctrine that a prior denial of certiorari should be understood to reflect 
the Justices’ views on the merits of the legal claims raised in the habeas 
petition.  It is no accident that Brown v. Allen, the decision that all 
recognize as adopting a de novo standard of review of legal and mixed 
questions on habeas, was also the decision that made clear that a prior 
denial of certiorari deserved no weight in the habeas calculus.  The close 
link the Court perceived between the two issues reflects the Court’s 
understanding of the forum-allocation function of habeas jurisdiction. 
In Part III, I show that the Court continued to adhere to the de novo 
standard of review until the enactment of AEDPA in 1996.  I review 
some of the limitations on habeas adopted by the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts and show that, notwithstanding these limitations, the Court 
continued to recognize that federal review of state court decisions 
resulting in custody was necessary to ensure that the state courts “toe[d] 
the constitutional mark.”17  If the Court continues to believe this, and if 
AEDPA bars the courts from granting habeas relief for some 
constitutional errors that otherwise would warrant reversal of the 
conviction, then the Court will need to rethink its current approach to 
granting direct review to state prisoners alleging constitutional violations.  
I. THE 1789-1916 PERIOD 
 
17 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 653 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)). 
	 6/20/16		10:34	AM	
108	 L A W 	 R E V I E W 	 [VOL.	__:_	
From the beginning of our history until after the Civil War, the 
federal courts generally lacked jurisdiction to grants writs of habeas 
corpus to persons in state custody.  After the Civil War, the habeas 
jurisdiction of the federal courts was extended to persons in state custody, 
but, as discussed below, the Court articulated and enforced extra-statutory 
rules according to which the federal courts were ordinarily to deny relief 
to persons who were being criminally tried or had been convicted in the 
state courts.  Nevertheless, during this entire period, state prisoners had a 
right of access to the federal courts for de novo review of questions of 
federal law and of application of such law to fact.  State prisoners had 
access to the U.S. Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction over federal 
questions decided in the state courts against a federal right-holder was 
mandatory.  The extra-statutory limits on the lower federal courts’ habeas 
jurisdiction were justified by the Court on forum-allocation grounds:  the 
proper forum for reviewing state criminal convictions was the Supreme 
Court on direct review, not the lower federal courts on collateral review.    
The Founders agreed that the Constitution should provide for federal 
courts in order to ensure state compliance with federal law and to protect 
federal rights.  Some believed that the Constitution should establish 
federal courts to adjudicate federal law in the first instance.  Others 
believed that it would be sufficient to provide for Supreme Court review 
of state court decisions regarding federal law.  As a result of the well-
known Madisonian Compromise, the Constitution created a Supreme 
Court and provided for Supreme Court review of state courts decisions 
on federal questions while empowering Congress to create lower federal 
courts to hear federal claims in the first instance if it believed such courts 
to be desirable.18  The Constitution’s default mechanism for monitoring 
state court enforcement of federal law was thus Supreme Court review of 
state courts decisions on federal questions. 
The Constitution gave Congress the power to make exceptions to the 
Supreme Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
provided for mandatory Supreme Court review by writ of error of state 
court decisions in which an asserted federal right or privilege had been 
denied.19  Thus, from the beginning, persons convicted of a crime in state 
court – like all litigants in the state courts – had a right to Supreme Court 
review of any federal claims or defenses they had raised that the state 
court had denied.20  
 
18 For the propositions in this paragraph, see RICHARD H. FALLON,  JR.  ET  AL.,  HART  &  
WECHSLER’S THE  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 18-19 (7th ed. 2015).  
19 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25.  
20 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (holding that Supreme Court review 
of such cases does not violate the Eleventh Amendment). 
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 Congress did not grant to the federal courts a general authority to 
grant habeas relief to state prisoners until after the Civil War.21  The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided “[t]hat writs of habeas corpus shall in no 
case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under 
or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for 
trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into 
court to testify.”22  As a result of this proviso, the federal courts were 
empowered to grant habeas relief only to federal prisoners.23 The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 entitled persons convicted of crimes in state court 
to federal review of their convictions, but allocated the responsibility of 
performing such review to the Supreme Court rather than the lower 
federal courts. 
 In 1867, Congress amended the Judiciary Act to authorize habeas 
relief "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty 
in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United 
States."24  The amendment thus conferred jurisdiction on the federal 
courts to grant habeas relief to persons in either state or federal custody.  
The Supreme Court did not have occasion to interpret this provision until 
1885, however, as Congress famously repealed the section of the Act 
authorizing appeals to the Supreme Court of the lower federal courts’ 
decisions under this Act.25  
 In Ex parte Royall, the first case to address the availability of federal 
habeas relief for state prisoners after Congress restored the Court’s 
jurisdiction over such appeals, the Court addressed the relation between 
the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions by 
persons in state custody and the Supreme Court’s obligation to review 
federal questions arising in state court through writ of error.26  Royall is 
best known for articulating what has since become known as the rule of 
exhaustion of state remedies.27  The Court in Royall confirmed that the 
 
21 Pursuant to amendments enacted in 1833 and 1842, the federal courts did have the 
authority to grant habeas relief (a) to persons in state or federal custody “for any act done 
or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of any order, process, or decree 
of any judge or court of the United States,” and (b) to “subjects or citizens of foreign 
states, in custody under national or state authority for acts done or omitted by or under 
color of foreign authority, and alleged to be valid under the law of nations.” 
22 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14. 
23 The federal courts could only issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum on behalf of 
persons in state custody.   
24 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). 
25 The Court upheld this repeal in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).  
26 Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 
27 On this rule, see generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1349-55. 
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federal courts have the power under the 1867 statutes to grant habeas 
relief to persons in state custody who are restrained of their liberty in 
violation of the Constitution, but went on to hold that the courts have 
discretion as to the time and mode of exercising this power.  “That 
discretion,” the Court held, “should be exercised in the light of the 
relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial 
tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in recognition of the fact 
that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by 
unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect 
rights secured by the constitution.”28  According to the Court, the federal 
courts should grant the writ immediately in “cases of urgency,” such as 
those “involving the authority and operations of the general government, 
the obligations of this country to or its relations with foreign nations.”29  
But, in the absence of “special circumstances requiring immediate 
action,” the court has discretion to remit the petitioner to the state courts, 
which have an equal obligation to give effect to federal constitutional 
rights.30  What the Court in Royall held to be within the courts’ discretion 
morphed in later cases into a requirement to exhaust state court remedies, 
which today is a statutory requirement.31 
 After state remedies have been exhausted, the Court in Royall went on 
to state, the habeas court “has still a discretion whether, under all the 
circumstances then existing, the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his 
writ of error from the highest court of the State, or whether it will 
proceed, by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the 
petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the 
United States.”32  Again, however, what in Royall was left largely to the 
lower federal court’s discretion morphed into a stricter requirement in 
later cases.  As the Court put it in Ex parte Frederich, “the general rule, and 
better practice, in the absence of special facts and circumstances, is to 
require a prisoner who claims that the judgment of a state court violates 
his rights under the constitution or laws of the United States to seek a 
review thereof by writ of error, instead of resorting to the writ of habeas 
corpus.”33   
 
28 Royall, 117 U.S. at 251. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 253. 
31 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). 
32 117 U.S. at 253. 
33 Ex parte Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 78 (1893). See also Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290-91 
(1898); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 (1896); Ex parte Fonda, 117 U. S. 516 
(1886); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U. S. 449 (1891); Wood v. Brush, 140 U. S. 278 (1891); 
Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U. S. 291(1891); Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183(1892); New York v. 
	 6/20/16		10:34	AM	
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 In Royall, the Court cited Ex parte Bridges as a case in which the court 
had found it appropriate for the federal court to grant habeas relief after 
exhaustion, rather than remit the petitioner to his writ of error.   
 Adverting to the argument that where a defendant has 
been regularly indicted, tried, and convicted in a state court, his 
only remedy was to carry the judgment to the state court of last 
resort, and thence by writ of error to this Court, [Justice 
Bradley in Bridges] said: “This might be so if the proceeding in 
the state court was merely erroneous; but where it is void for 
want of jurisdiction, habeas corpus will lie, and may be issued 
by any court or judge invested with supervisory jurisdiction in 
such case.”34   
Bradley was referring to the distinction, often invoked during this period, 
“between an erroneous judgment, and one that is illegal or void.”35  As 
the Court put it in Ex parte Siebold, “[t]he only ground on which this court, 
or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on 
habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another 
court, is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the 
cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.”36   
The distinction between erroneous and void convictions was 
articulated in cases, such as Siebold, involving petitions for habeas corpus 
by persons in federal custody, but the Court came to apply the distinction 
to habeas petitions by state prisoners.37 In addition to the rendering 
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter, the 
Court came to recognize as among the flaws that render a conviction void 
the unconstitutionality of the statute that the petitioner was convicted of 
violating or of the sentence imposed.38   The cases gradually expanding 
the types of errors that render a criminal conviction void appear to base 
that conclusion on the Court’s evaluation of the importance of the right 
that was violated rather than any inherent characteristic of the state 
court’s error.39  Be that as it may, the permissible grounds for granting 
 
Eno, 155 U. S. 89 (1894); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U. S. 100 (1894); Bergemann v. Backer, 
157 U. S. 655 (1895). 
34 Royall, 117 U.S. at 253. 
35 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879). 
36 Id. 
37 E.g., Ex parte Frederich, 149 U.S. 70 (1983). 
38 See Bator, supra note 3, at 468. 
39 This is the position defended by Professor Liebman, who disputes Professor Bator’s 
claim that habeas review was available only if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction or if 
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habeas relief during this period were narrower than the grounds for 
reversing a state court conviction on direct appeal. 
 Royall’s citation of Bridges suggested that cases in which the state 
court judgment was void were among those in which remitting the 
prisoner to his writ of error was not appropriate.  Later cases, however, 
made clear that, except in cases of urgency, a petitioner would be left to 
his writ of error even in such cases.40  As Bridges illustrates, the Court did 
occasionally uphold a grant of habeas relief to a state prisoner, but, as the 
turn of the century approached, the Court’s insistence on the exclusivity 
of recourse to the writ of error grew more rigid,41 rendering largely moot 
the theoretical availability of habeas to release state prisoners whose 
convictions were void.   
 Importantly, however, the Court’s curtailment of habeas relief for 
state prisoners during this period did not mean that federal relief for 
erroneously convicted state prisoners was unavailable.  Such prisoners 
had a right to direct review of their convictions in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  The cases limiting the availability of habeas relief when writ of 
error review was available were explained in forum-allocation terms.  The 
Supreme Court was regarded as the more appropriate forum for the 
adjudication of such cases because of the sensitivity of the reversal of a 
state criminal conviction that had been upheld by the state’s highest 
court:   
It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the 
federal courts, by which a person under an indictment in a 
state court, and subject to its laws, may, by the decision of a 
single judge of the federal court, upon a writ of habeas corpus, 
be taken out of the custody of the officers of the state, and 
finally discharged therefrom, and thus a trial by the state courts 
of an indictment found under the laws of a state be finally 
prevented.42 
It was considered unseemly for a single lower federal court to set a state 
prisoner free and create “unnecessary conflict between courts equally 
bound to guard and protect rights secured by the constitution.”43 Only 
review in the Supreme Court would be consistent with the dignity of the 
 
the petitioner was convicted under an unconstitutional law or received an unconstitutional 
sentence. Liebman, supra note 7, at 2041.  
40 E.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898). 
41 See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2005.  
42 Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898).  
43 New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89, 94 (1894). 
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state courts and respect for their constitutional obligation to enforce 
federal rights.44  Confirming the forum-allocation nature of these rules, 
the Court did allow the grant of habeas relief in the few cases in which 
writ of error review was unavailable.45   
II.    THE  1916-1953 PERIOD 
Beginning in 1916, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over 
state court decisions began to shift from being mandatory to being 
discretionary.  In 1916, Congress for the first time made Supreme Court 
review of some state court decisions denying claims of federal rights 
discretionary.46  Writ of error review was retained for state court decisions 
upholding “an authority exercised under any State” that had been 
challenged on federal grounds, as well as decisions upholding state 
statutes challenged on federal grounds or invalidating federal statute33s or 
treaties on constitutional grounds.47  In other cases raising federal 
questions, review was available only through the discretionary writ of 
certiorari.  Congress restricted the scope of writ of error review further in 
1925, retaining such review only for decisions upholding state statutes 
challenged on constitutional grounds or invalidating federal statutes or 
treaties on constitutional grounds.48  
 Although some appeals of state criminal convictions continued to 
fall within the categories of cases subject to mandatory Supreme Court 
review under the 1916 and 1925 amendments to the Judiciary Act, they 
constituted only a small portion of the state criminal convictions that fell 
within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction before 1916.  Thus, after 1916, 
and especially after 1925, very few persons convicted of crimes in state 
court were entitled, as a statutory matter, to federal review of the federal 
issues that were decided against them by the state courts.   
 All agree that de novo review was available to state prisoners via 
habeas corpus at least as of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Allen 
in 1953. Thus, at least as of that date, federal habeas review filled the gap 
that was created by the elimination of mandatory Supreme Court review 
 
44 See Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 (1892) (“[C]omity demands that the state courts, 
under whose process he is held, and which are, equally with the federal courts, charged 
with the duty of protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his constitutional rights, 
should be appealed to in the first instance.”). See supra  note 33 for additional cases 
explaining the preference for review in the Supreme Court.  
45 See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2076–81. 
46 FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 462–63. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. Congress eliminated mandatory Supreme Court review of state courts decisions 
entirely in 1988. Id. 
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via writ of error.   The situation during the decades before Brown v. Allen 
is a matter of some controversy, however.   
The scope of federal habeas review in the decades before Brown 
has been the subject of fierce debate among modern scholars.  The 
controversy is reflected in the highly charged exchange of dicta between 
Justice Thomas and Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West.49  One side of this 
debate, whose version of the pre-Brown history was endorsed by Justice 
Thomas, relies heavily on the analysis of Professor Paul M. Bator in his 
influential article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners.50  This side contends that, before Brown v. Allen, habeas review 
was available only for claims that the state court lacked jurisdiction or 
denied a full and fair hearing for the constitutional claim. The other side 
of the debate, endorsed by Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West, was 
developed by Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia,51 and later defended by 
Professor Gary Peller.52  This side contends that de novo review of 
constitutional claims was always available on habeas and that only the 
substantive protections provided by the Constitution in criminal trials 
expanded over the years.  More recently, Professor James Liebman has 
argued that both Bator and Brennan/Peller got certain aspects of the 
history wrong and has defended an intermediate position.53  Liebman 
maintains that the availability of habeas review of constitutional questions 
was limited when Supreme Court review of state criminal convictions was 
mandatory, but became plenary when Supreme Court review became 
discretionary.    
Justice Frankfurter understated matters when he wrote in 1947 
that the availability of habeas relief in the federal courts during this period 
was “an untidy area” of the law.54  Nevertheless, the cases do strongly 
support two interrelated theses.  First, the period between 1916 and 1953 
was a transitional period characterized by disagreement among the 
Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas review.  Second, the 
debate among the Justices was not about the need for meaningful federal 
review of state criminal convictions, but about whether such review 
should take place in the Supreme Court on direct review or in the lower 
federal courts via habeas corpus.   The need for meaningful review in 
some federal court was recognized on all sides; the disagreement was 
 
49 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992). 
50 Bator, supra note 3. 
51 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
52 See Peller, supra note 6.  
53 Liebman, supra note 7. 
54 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).   
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about the appropriate tribunal. 
A.  The Debate About the Scope of Habeas Review  Before Brown 
 The opening salvo in the current debate about the scope of habeas 
review of state criminal convictions during this period came from 
Professor Bator.  Bator claimed that the basic rule during the Nineteenth 
Century was that habeas relief was available only to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the committing court, although he acknowledged that the 
concept of “jurisdiction” was stretched to include the constitutionality of 
the law under which the petitioner was convicted and the constitutionality 
of the sentence imposed,55 and he acknowledged that some cases were 
difficult to reconcile with his claim.56 According to Bator, the Court 
broadened the availability of habeas review in Frank v. Magnum,57 holding 
that mob domination of the court and jury would be a cognizable claim 
on habeas if the state court system failed to cure the problem by offering 
an untainted hearing.58  In his view, the Court in Moore v. Dempsey59 
applied this standard and concluded that habeas relief was required 
because the state had failed to provide an untainted hearing for the claim 
of mob domination.60  According to Professor Bator, the Court in Brown 
v. Allen radically expanded the availability of habeas relief by holding for 
the first time that habeas was available for the relitigation of 
constitutional claims that had been fully and fairly litigated in the state 
courts.61   
 Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, for their part, argued that 
federal habeas relief was available for the relitigation of constitutional 
claims from the beginning.62  The Nineteenth Century denials of relief 
during earlier periods merely reflected the narrow scope then given to 
substantive constitutional rights.63  The apparent broadening of habeas 
 
55 See Bator, supra note 3, at 468, 483–84. 
56 See id. at 470–71. 
57 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
58 Id. at 486–87. 
59 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
60 See Bator, supra note 3 at 488–91. 
61 See id. at 500. 
    62 Peller, supra note 6, at 663; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963)     (“Congress 
in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum for state prisoners having constitutional 
defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers of the federal courts to their 
constitutional maximum. Obedient to this purpose, we have consistently held that federal 
court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not 
defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings.”).  
    63 Peller, supra note 6, at 621–22. 
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relief reflected in Moore and then in Brown actually resulted from the 
progressive broadening of constitutional protections in the criminal 
sphere.64 
 Professor Liebman argues that both Bator and Peller get the history 
wrong in certain respects.65  Liebman argues that the 1867 statute always 
authorized review of constitutional issues decided by the state courts, but 
only “where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights.”66   During the Nineteenth Century, habeas was almost never 
necessary for this purpose, as any person convicted in the state courts had 
a right to Supreme Court review of any federal questions decided against 
him by the state court.  Thus the Court during this period established that 
federal habeas corpus was not available as a substitute for writ of error 
review, holding that the writ of error was the exclusive remedy.67  But, 
according to Liebman, the Court abandoned its rule treating writ of error 
review as exclusive in the early Twentieth Century when its mandatory 
writ of error jurisdiction came to be replaced by discretionary certiorari 
jurisdiction.68   
The replacement of mandatory review with discretionary review 
happened officially with the enactment of legislation amending the 
statutes governing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 1916 and 
1925, but Professor Liebman claims that the change began to occur 
“unofficially” shortly before that.69  Thus, he explains Frank v. Magnum’s 
failure to rely on the exclusivity of writ of error review in 1915 as 
resulting from the unofficial “certiorarification” of the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction,70 and he argues that the Moore v. Dempsey decision in 1923 was 
based on the statutory shift to certiorari review.71   The different 
outcomes in Frank and Moore, according to Liebman, are attributable to 
their differing conceptions of the mob domination question.  In Frank, 
the question was treated as one of fact, as to which de novo habeas 
review does not extend; in Moore, the issue was treated as a mixed 
 
64 See id. at 643–44, 647–49. 
65 Liebman, supra note 7, at 2054. 
66 Id. at 2055 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942)). 
67 See Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).  See supra Part I. 
68 See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2075. 
69 See id. at 2077–78. 
70 See id.  Professor Liebman was referring to the Court’s practice of dismissing writs of 
error summarily if they did not present a substantial federal question.   
71 See id. 
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question subject to de novo review.72  In Liebman’s view, de novo 
relitigation of legal and mixed questions on habeas has clearly been 
available since writ of error review was replaced by certiorari review.73  
The only significant change between Moore and Brown, in his view, was the 
increase in the number of federal constitutional rights applicable in state 
criminal proceedings. 74 
Professors Bator and Peller both acknowledge that some of the 
Court’s cases are in tension with their theories, as did Justice Brennan.75  
Their disagreement was thus about the overall thrust of the law during 
this period. Professor Liebman too recognizes that some of the cases 
were difficult to reconcile with his theory.76  In particular, he recognizes 
that “the Court took time to come to grips with the fact that the 
certioratification of its direct appeal docket made the Royall compromise 
untenable,” and that, “[a]lthough Frank and especially Moore adumbrated 
the Court’s eventual resolution, only Brown forthrightly adopted it.” 77 As 
the cases discussed below show, however, Brown was not a belated 
recognition of a change in the Court’s direct review that had occurred 
many years earlier.  Rather, the pre-Brown cases reflected the continued 
belief by the Court (or some Justices), long after the Court had adopted a 
highly discretionary approach reviewing state court decisions on other 
matters, that the Supreme Court had a duty to review the constitutional 
claims of persons convicted of crimes in state court.   
 
    72 See id. at 2078–80. 
    73 See id. at 2080–81. 
    74 See id. at 2081–83. 
75 Professor Bator admitted that the Court gave no consideration to the “reaches and 
purposes of the habeas jurisdiction” between Frank and Brown and that “some opinions [] 
could be taken to intimate that the writ automatically reaches the merits of all federal 
constitutional questions.” Bator, supra note 3, at 496–98. Justice Brennan conceded that 
the Court did not hold to an “unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of 
the Great Writ,” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411–412 (1963), and that the availability of writ 
of error review prior to 1916 was “a powerful influence against the allowance of [habeas 
review for] state prisoners.” Id. at 413. Finally, in examining how denials of certiorari 
foreclosed habeas review of state-prisoner claims between Frank and Brown, Professor 
Peller explains that “Hawk and its progeny invited the federal habeas courts to give 
substantive weight to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari,” but that these lower courts 
at the time either gave no weight to the Court’s denials or were in fact “deferring to the 
Supreme Court,” rather than the state courts. Peller, supra note 6, at 660–61.  
76 See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2083 (noting that, although “some pre-Brown cases 
assumed or concluded that the Court’s denial of certiorari did not supply the statutorily 
mandated review as of right,” “[o]ther decisions did give the denial of certiorari effect.”). 
77 Id.  
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Professor Liebman is correct in arguing that the federal courts’ 
habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap in federal review left by the 
certiorarification of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.   But the 
cases show that this certiorarification took considerably longer to take 
hold with respect to state court decisions resulting in criminal convictions 
than in other cases.  Well after 1916, a majority of Justices continued to 
adhere to the Court’s pre-1916 view that the sensitive task of reviewing 
state court convictions and possibly releasing a state prisoner whose 
conviction had been affirmed by the highest state courts was a task solely 
for the Supreme Court itself to perform.  Only when the Court came to 
realize that it could no longer hope to fulfill this error-correction role did 
the Court definitively abandon the pre-1916 preference for direct review 
as the exclusive mechanism for reviewing state court convictions.  The 
Court wavered on this point in the years immediately preceding Brown.   
The Court’s definitive abandonment of its insistence on direct review as 
the preferred mechanism for reviewing state court convictions is reflected 
in its holding in Brown that denials of certiorari do not reflect the Justices’ 
views on the merits of the petitioners’ federal claims.  The Court’s 
holding in Brown that habeas courts should apply a de novo standard in 
deciding questions of law and missed questions of law and fact was 
directly related to its holding that the Court’s denial of certiorari should 
be given no weight by federal courts adjudicating habeas petitions. 
B.    The Court’s Gradual Expansion of Habeas  Review Between                     
1916 and 1953 
Professor Liebman is clearly right to note that habeas relief was 
generally unavailable when a state prisoner had a right to direct review in 
the Supreme Court via writ of error.  He also convincingly shows that, 
after the shift from mandatory to discretionary direct review, the Court 
abandoned pre-1916 limits on the availability of habeas relief in direct 
response to the more limited availability of direct review of state criminal 
convictions in the Supreme Court.  But this shift did not occur on or 
around 1916.  The shift was more gradual and only completed with the 
Brown decision in 1953.  
a.   The Court’s Continued Application of Pre-1916 Limits 
In the early post-1916 cases, the Court continued to invoke and 
apply the proposition that habeas relief is available only if the state court 
lacked jurisdiction or if for other reasons its judgment was void.   In 
Knewal v. Egan, for example, the Court wrote that “[i]t is the settled rule of 
this court that habeas corpus calls in question only the jurisdiction of the 
court whose judgment is challenged.”78   As late as 1938, the Court was 
 
78 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925) (citing, inter alia, Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915)). 
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continuing to recite this limit on habeas relief.  Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 
the Court wrote that “habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of 
reviewing errors of law and irregularities – not involving the question of 
jurisdiction – occurring during the course of trial,” and that the "writ of 
habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error."79   
At the same time, the Court expanded the concept of jurisdictional 
errors to include errors that are not jurisdictional in any straightforward 
sense.  Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court concluded that a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the course of a trial “stands 
as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of 
his life or his liberty.”80  The Court’s characterization of this defect as a 
jurisdictional one appears to have followed, in the Court’s analysis, from 
its view that denial of habeas relief for this type of error would have left 
the victim of a constitutional error remediless:  “To deprive a citizen of 
his only effective remedy would not only be contrary to the ‘rudimentary 
demands of justice’ but destructive of a constitutional guaranty 
specifically designed to prevent injustice.”81  The Court appears to have 
concluded that any violation of constitutional rights was a “jurisdictional” 
defect warranting habeas relief, reasoning that, “[s]ince the Sixth 
Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the 
assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an 
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive 
an accused of his life or liberty.”82  That the Court had reached this 
understanding of a “jurisdictional” defect, and thus of the available scope 
of habeas relief, is confirmed by its decision the following Term in Bowen 
v. Johnston.  After again reciting that “[t]he scope of review on habeas 
corpus is limited to the examination of the jurisdiction of the court whose 
judgment of conviction is challenged,”83 the Court went on to state:  “But 
if it be found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner, or that 
in its proceedings his constitutional rights have been denied, the remedy of habeas 
corpus is available.”84 
The Court abandoned the “jurisdictional” limitation with respect to 
claims of constitutional error a few years later in Waley v. Johnston.  The  
Court stated:  
 
79 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (citing, inter alia, Knewal, 268 U.S. 442). 
80 Id. at 468.   
81 Id. at 467. 
82 Id.  
83 306 U.S. 19, 23 (1939) (citing, inter alia, Knewal, 268 U.S. 442). 
84 Id. at 24 (citing, inter alia, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923), and Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938)). 
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[T]he use of the writ in the federal courts to test the 
constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted 
to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for 
want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it.  It extends 
also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in 
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where 
the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights.85   
Professor Liebman argues that this had been the rule all along.   State 
court convictions infected with constitutional error had always been 
understood to render the conviction “void,” but, when the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions was mandatory, 
habeas review was not “the only effective means if preserving [the 
prisoner’s] rights.”  When the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction became 
discretionary, he argues, this rationale for denying habeas relief 
evaporated and habeas relief became widely available.86   
The cases discussed above, however, indicate that the 
“jurisdictional” category came to encompass constitutional errors only 
gradually.   The demise of the preference for direct review of state 
criminal convictions also occurred more gradually.  Indeed, the Court in 
Waley itself hinted at this latter limitation when it noted that habeas relief 
was appropriate in the case because “[t]he facts relied on are dehors the 
record and their effect on the judgment was not open to consideration 
and review on appeal.”87 This qualification suggests the Court’s continued 
adherence to the belief that habeas should not be used as a substitute for 
direct review in the Supreme Court. 
Earlier post-1916 are more explicit in asserting the exclusivity of 
direct review, even in cases that did not appear to fall within the scope of 
the Court’s narrowed mandatory jurisdiction.  Thus, in Craig v. Hecht, 
decided in 1923, the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief on the 
ground that “[t]he circuit court of appeals correctly applied the well 
established general rule that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be utilized for 
the purpose of proceedings in error.”88  And in Goto v. Lane, decided the 
following year, the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief on the 
ground that, “[i]f [the court in which the petitioner was convicted] erred 
in determining [federal law], its judgment was not for that reason void, 
but subject to correction in regular course on writ of error. If the 
 
85 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1943).  These propositions applied at least to the 
case before the Court because  
86 Liebman, supra note 7, at 2083. 
87 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. at 104. 
88 263 U.S. at 277 (1923). 
	 6/20/16		10:34	AM	
2016]	 H A B E A S 	 A S 	 F O R U M 	 A L L O C A T I O N 	 121	
questions presented involved the application of constitutional principles, 
that alone did not alter the rule.  And, if the petitioners permitted the time 
within which a review on writ of error might be obtained to elapse and 
thereby lost the opportunity for such a review, that gave no right to resort 
to habeas corpus as a substitute.”89  And in United States ex rel. Kennedy 
v. Tyler, decided in 1925, the Court wrote: 
In so far as [the petitioner’s claims] involve treaty or 
constitutional rights, [the state] courts are as competent 
as the federal courts to decide them. In the regular and 
ordinary course of procedure, the power of the highest 
state court in respect of such questions should first be 
exhausted. When that has been done, the authority of 
this court may be invoked to protect a party against any 
adverse decision involving a denial of a federal right 
properly asserted by him.90 
 As late as the early 1940’s, the lower federal courts understood the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine on this question to be that  “[w]hen [a state 
prisoner] has exhausted the judicial remedies afforded by the State and 
has secured a decision from its highest court, his sole recourse will be to 
invoke the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States ‘to 
protect . . . against any adverse decision involving a denial of a federal 
right properly asserted . . . .”91  “In view of the delicate question of 
interference by inferior Federal courts with the judgments of the courts 
of a sovereign state of the Union which is presented by an application 
[for habeas corpus], it appears to be the approved practice that if such an 
application is to be presented after exhaustion of State judicial remedies, 
it should be made directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.”92 
 The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Ex parte Hawk, in 1944, 
citing the foregoing lower court cases and others to the same effect, 
apparently with approval.93 The Court stated that, “[w]here the state 
courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of his contentions, and 
this Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state court's 
decision, a federal court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas 
corpus the questions thus adjudicated.”94  The Court did qualify this rule:  
 
89 265 U.S. 393, 402 (1924). 
90 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925). 
91 Hawk v. Olson, 130 F.2d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1942) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925)). 
92 Kramer v. State of Nevada, 122 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1941).    
93 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944). 
94 Id. at 118. 
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“[W]here resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair 
adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either because the state 
affords no remedy, or because in the particular case the remedy afforded 
by state law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate, a 
federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he 
would be remediless.”95  These exceptions appear to align with Professor 
Bator’s view of the limited nature of federal habeas relief before Brown. 
 These cases are thus in tension with Professor Liebman’s claim that 
habeas review of constitutional issues became generally available at the 
time of, and as a result of, the certiorarification of the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction just before 1916.  Even well after the Court’s 
mandatory review by writ of error was replaced by discretionary certiorari 
review, the Court continued to express the view that review of state 
criminal convictions should ordinarily occur in the Supreme Court on 
direct review rather than on collateral review through habeas corpus. 
 Nevertheless, the cases support a forum-allocation understanding 
of habeas jurisdiction.  As shown below, the Court determined the 
availability of habeas based on its views regarding the proper federal 
forum for reviewing state criminal convictions.  The limitations on the 
availability of habeas relief during this period did not reflect the view that 
state prisoners convicted as a result of constitutional error should 
nevertheless remain in prison.  The Court’s continuing insistence that 
review of state criminal convictions take place in the Supreme Court 
reflected its view that the Supreme Court itself was the appropriate forum 
for monitoring state court decisions resulting in custody, and that the 
Court remained capable of doing so.  Gradually, as the constitutional 
rights of prisoners expanded and the number of cases increased, the 
Court reached the conclusion that it could no longer fulfill that role.  It is 
no coincidence that Brown v. Allen, the case that all agree affirmed the 
right to relitigate constitutional issues through habeas, was also the case in 
which the Court for the first time definitely held that a federal habeas 
petitioner need not have sought direct review in the Supreme Court on 
certiorari.96 
 Today, the Supreme Court grants a minuscule proportion of the 
petitions for certiorari presented to it.97  It selects cases presenting 
important, broadly applicable issues in which the lower courts or the state 
 
95 Id. 
96 See Edward Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:  Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the 
Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1713 (2000). 
97 The Supreme Court – The Statistics, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 389 (2015) (noting that in 
2014 the Court only granted review for one percent of the petitions before it).  
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courts have reached conflicting decisions.98  A petition arguing that the 
court below has made a case-specific constitutional error will rarely, if 
ever, be granted.99  If the Court had applied that standard during the years 
immediately following 1916, then many convictions vitiated by 
constitutional error would have remained unremedied as a result of the 
Court’s insistence that such convictions should ordinarily be reviewed by 
the Court itself or not at all.   But  the Court did not apply today’s 
certiorari standard to certiorari petitions by state prisoners until well after 
1916.    
b.   The Court’s Early Approach to Certiorari 
 The main advocate of limiting writ of error review and expanding 
certiorari review was the Supreme Court itself, principally Chief Justice 
Taft.  In advocating this change, the Justices assured Congress that it 
would exercise its discretion with particular attention to its responsibility 
to protect constitutional rights.  As far as the Justices’ statements to 
Congress revealed, writes Professor Hartnett,  
the only use envisioned in constitutional cases was as a way 
of quickly dealing with claims that were either frivolous or 
plainly governed by precedent – that is, in cases where the 
lower court was obviously correct and summary affirmance 
would be appropriate. Taft expressed confidence that in no 
case “would a constitutional question of any real merit or 
doubt escape our review by the method of certiorari,” 
explaining that the restrictions were merely “to keep out 
constitutional questions that have really no weight or have 
been fully decided in previous cases and that have only been 
projected into the case for the purpose of securing delay or 
a reconsideration of questions the decision of which has 
already become settled law.”100  
 Consistent with this legislative history, the rule the Court adopted 
at the time to guide the exercise of its discretion with respect to certiorari 
differed substantially from the present rule.  Today’s rule reflects the 
Court’s focus on ensuring uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.  
The factors it takes into account in granting certiorari include only the 
existence of a conflict in the interpretation of federal law among the 
courts of appeals or the state courts and the “importan[ce]” of the legal 
 
98 EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 239 (10th ed. 2013). 
99 Id. (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error 
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of 
law.”).  
100 Id. at  1715. 
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question.101  The current rule also makes clear that “[a] petition for a writ 
of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of . . . the 
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”102 
  The 1925 version of the rule differed in important respects.  
According to the earlier rule, the “reasons which will be considered” in 
determining whether to grant certiorari included that “a state court has 
decided a federal question of substance . . . in a way probably not in 
accord with applicable decisions of this court.”103  As written, the rule 
suggests that the Court at that time understood its role, with respect to 
cases coming from the state courts, to include an error correction 
function.   This would be consistent with the assurances the Chief Justice 
provided to Congress in advocating the shift to certiorari review. Under 
this standard, a denial of certiorari in a case coming from the state courts 
might be understood to reflect a determination by at least six Justices that 
the underlying constitutional question had (in the Chief Justice’s words) 
“no weight” or had been “projected into the case for the purpose of 
securing delay or a reconsideration of questions the decision of which has 
already become settled law.”104 
 Whether the Court in fact exercised its discretion in this way with 
respect to requests for review from persons convicted of crimes in state 
court is difficult to demonstrate directly.  Since the Court does not 
explain its reasons for denying certiorari, it is difficult to establish 
definitively that such denials were tantamount to a determination on the 
 
101 SUP. CT. R. 10.  Rule 10 lists the following three factors: 
• (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict 
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the 
same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a 
way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has 
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call 
for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power; 
• (b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal 
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court 
of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; 
• (c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a 
way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. 
102 Id. 
103 See SUP. CT. R. 35.5(a), 266 U.S. 681 (1924); see William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L. J. 1, 3 (1925). 
104 Harnett, supra note 96, at 1731 n. 488.  
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merits that the underlying claim lacked merit.  Nevertheless, there is 
indirect support for the proposition that, at least in the early years, the 
Justices so understood the denial of certiorari to petitions filed by state 
prisoners. 
 Preliminarily, the data concerning the number of such filings are 
consistent with this thesis.  The table in the Appendix indicates the 
number of requests for review filed in the Supreme Court between 1916 
and 1953 by persons convicted of crimes in state court. Column A lists 
the number of requests for review filed by writ of error each year.  
Column B lists the number of requests for review by writ of certiorari 
filed each year.  Column C indicates the number of petitions for certiorari 
denied in each year.  The table shows that, until 1933, the number of 
certiorari petitions filed was in the single digits except for one year (1928) 
in which eleven certiorari petitions were filed.  With such a low number 
of petitions to consider, it is plausible that the Court’s decisions on 
petitions for certiorari brought by state prisoners reflected the Justices’ 
views on the merits of the claims presented.  Between 1934 and 1939, the 
number of petitions each year was in the teens (or lower).  The annual 
number was in the twenties from 1940 to 1945, and thereafter was in the 
30s and 40s.  With this larger number of petitions, it is plausible that the 
Justices came to conclude that it was no longer feasible for it to continue 
to base its decisions regarding certiorari on its views of the underlying 
merits of the claims raised.  
 Affirmative support for the claim that denials of certiorari during 
this period to persons convicted of crimes in state courts reflected the 
Justices’ views on the merits of the petitions can be found in the Justices’ 
opinions.  As noted above, the early cases, up to and including Ex parte 
Hawk, reveal that, in the absence of exceptional urgency warranting a 
departure from the usual exhaustion rules, the Court insisted that state 
prisoners seek direct review in the Supreme Court and that, if the Court 
denied review, a lower federal court should ordinarily deny a subsequent 
habeas petition.  In support of this procedure, the Court cited pre-1916 
cases that, in turn, made clear that the exclusivity of writ of error review 
was not just a matter of judicial efficiency.  The rule was also based on the 
notion that reversing a state criminal conviction that had been upheld by 
the states’ highest courts was a delicate matter.  It was unseemly for a 
single federal judge to set at liberty a duly convicted prisoner who had 
received several layers of review in the state courts.105 The Court’s forum-
allocation rule was thus based on the conviction that, of the two available 
avenues for reviewing state criminal convictions, direct review in the 
Supreme Court was superior from the standpoint of federal-state relations 
 
105 See supra texts accompanying notes 42–44. 
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and respect for the dignity of state courts, and that the lower federal 
courts should accordingly grant habeas relief only in cases of peculiar 
urgency. 
 The Court’s continuing invocation of this preference after 1916 
means that the Court believed that this rationale retained force despite the 
shift to discretionary review.  This choice between two remedies available 
in federal court makes sense only if direct review offered a realistic 
avenue for correcting the errors that would otherwise be corrected in the 
lower federal courts on habeas.  (As we have seen, this category was 
understood to encompass in principle all constitutional errors at least as 
of 1942.)  The idea was that it was the Supreme Court’s obligation to 
monitor state court compliance with federal law in criminal cases.  And 
since “ought” presupposes “can,” the Court’s adherence to this forum 
allocation reflects the Justices’ views that fulfilling this role was possible 
for the Court. 
c.   Post-Hawk Erosion of Preference for Direct Review 
 The Court’s decisions after Ex parte Hawk show the gradual erosion 
of the pre-1916 limits on habeas review.   At the same time, these cases 
provide additional support for the claim that these limits continued to be 
applied well into the 1916-1953 period.   
The post-Hawk decisions wavered on whether a request for direct 
review in the Supreme Court should be a pre-requisite for seeking habeas 
corpus in the lower federal courts.  The opinions in these cases show that 
the Justices who insisted on that requirement did so out of a belief, based 
on the dignitary concerns mentioned earlier, that reviewing a state 
conviction and possibly releasing a state prisoner was a role for the 
Supreme Court and not the lower federal courts.  The cases show that the 
Justices believed until at least the mid-1940’s that the Supreme Court had 
a “duty of passing upon charges of state violations of federal 
constitutional rights” in such cases.106    
Gradually, the contrary view came to prevail.  The debate between 
the Justices in these later cases sheds useful light on the rationale 
supporting the narrower availability of habeas review in the earlier period 
as well as the rationale for dropping those limits. The limits were dropped 
because the Justices came to recognize that, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s increasing caseload, the Court could no longer hope to fulfill an 
error correction function, even in the subcategory of cases consisting of 
requests for direct review by state prisoners.  
 
106 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 216 (1950). 
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 Four years after Ex parte Hawk, the Court in Wade v. Mayo relaxed 
the requirement that a habeas petitioner have sought direct review of his 
claims in the Supreme Court.  The majority quoted the relevant passage 
from Ex parte Hawk and agreed that: 
Considerations of prompt and orderly procedure in the 
federal courts will often dictate that direct review be 
sought first in this Court.  And where a prisoner has 
neglected to seek that review, such failure may be a 
relevant consideration for a district court in determining 
whether to entertain a subsequent habeas corpus 
petition.107 
Nevertheless, the Court declined to adopt a “hard and fast rule” requiring 
a prior request for direct review in the Supreme Court.  The majority 
cited “the volume of this Court’s business,”108 and said that “[m]atters 
relevant to the exercise of  our certiorari discretion frequently result in 
denials of the writ without any consideration of the merits.”109  “Where it 
is apparent or even possible” that the Court’s views regarding the 
substance of the claim “ha[d] no bearing” on the denial of the writ, 
“failure to file a petition should not prejudice the right to file a habeas 
corpus application in a district court.”110  In the case before it, the Court 
concluded that it was “reasonably certain” that the writ had been denied 
because of doubts about whether the state court judgment rested on an 
adequate state ground.111  
 The majority’s analysis shows that even the Justices in favor of 
relaxing the requirement understood that a denial of certiorari in cases 
seeking review of state court convictions sometimes reflected the Justices’ 
views of the merits, and they required a showing of at least a possibility 
that such was the case.  But these Justices were willing to relax the 
requirement because, by this time, in their view, denials of certiorari 
“frequently” did not reflect the Justices’ views of the merits and, in light 
of the volume of the Court’s business, “[g]ood judicial administration is 
not furthered by insistence on futile procedure.”112 
 Writing for four Justices, Justice Reed strenuously dissented.   
According to the dissenting Justices, “wise administration commands that 
 
107 334 U.S. 672, 680 (1948). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 680–81. 
111 Id. at 682. 
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this Court be asked, by appeal or certiorari, to pass upon the federal 
constitutional questions presented.  It is only by such a procedure that the 
validity of state criminal conviction can be expeditiously and finally 
adjudicated.”113  Justice Reed elaborated: 
[W]henever a prisoner brings a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the federal courts challenging collaterally a 
conviction in the state courts and asking release from state 
custody, serious questions of the relation between the federal 
and state judicial structures are raised.  “It is an exceedingly 
delicate jurisdiction given to the federal courts, by which a 
person under indictment in a state court, and subject to its 
laws, may, by a decision of a single judge of a federal court, 
upon a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of the custody of 
the officers of the state and finally discharged therefrom . . . .”  
Respect for the theory and practice of our dual system 
government requires that federal courts intervene by habeas 
corpus in state criminal prosecutions only in exceptional 
circumstances.114  
Justice Reed referred to appeal and certiorari as “the normal paths of 
review” which, when they are “open to correct federal constitutional 
errors in state criminal proceedings,” bears upon the desirability of 
limiting the habeas corpus power of federal courts in respect of state 
criminal prosecutions.115  “It is not seemly that years after a conviction, 
when time has dulled memories, when death has stilled tongues, when 
records are unavailable, convicted felons, unburdened by any handicap to 
a normal presentation of any claim of unfairness in their trial, should be 
permitted to attack their sentences collaterally by habeas corpus because 
of errors, known to them at the time of trial.”116   
 Justice Reed did not state directly that a denial of certiorari 
ordinarily reflects the Justices’ view that the petitioner’s claims are 
unmeritorious, but this would appear to be the implication of his 
insistence that the availability of certiorari review – the “normal” 
“remedy” for constitutional errors in the state courts – should ordinarily 
preclude habeas relief, despite his agreement that the writ of habeas 
corpus is “a proper procedure ‘to safeguard the liberty of all persons . . . 
 
113 Id. at 687 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. at 691 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 692 (Reed, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 694 (“Where there is a denial of 
constitutional rights by the highest court of a state, a remedy exists by direct review in this 
Court.”).  
116 Id. at 695 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
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against infringement through any violation of the Constitution.’”117  That 
this was his view is confirmed by his opinion for the majority in Darr v. 
Burford, discussed below. 
 Between the decisions in Wade v. Mayo and Darr v. Burford, Congress 
amended the habeas statute.118   The amendment codified the exhaustion 
rule of Ex parte Hawk in the following terms: 
Sec. 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts. An 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is 
either an absence of available State corrective process or the 
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to 
protect the rights of the prisoner. 
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning 
of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to 
raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.119 
Although the amendment did not refer to direct review in the 
Supreme Court, the chairman of the committee appointed by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to propose the amendment that was 
ultimately adopted, Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit, explained 
that its primary purpose was to ensure that, except in exceptional 
circumstances, review of state criminal convictions should take place 
solely in the Supreme Court: 
The thing in mind in the drafting of this section was to provide 
that review of state court action be had so far as possible only 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, whose review of 
such action has historical basis, and that review not be had by 
the lower federal courts, whose exercise of such power is 
unseemly and likely to breed dangerous conflicts of 
jurisdiction.120 
 
117 Id. at 690 (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 
(1915)).   
118 Congress enacted the amendment just two days after the decision in Wade v. Mayo 
came down, so Congress did not take the decision into account in its deliberations. 
119 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952)(originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 
967).  
120 Hon. John J. Parker, Limiting The Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176 
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The amendment accomplished this goal through its final clause: 
The effect of this last provision is to eliminate, for all practical 
purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal courts for 
habeas corpus in all states in which successive applications may 
be made for habeas corpus to the state courts; for, in all such 
states, the applicant has the right, notwithstanding the denial of 
prior applications, to apply again to the state courts for habeas 
corpus and to have action upon such later application reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States on application for 
certiorari.121 
According to Judge Parker, the holding of Wade v. Mayo would now 
“be in the teeth of” the habeas statute.122  As Parker described the effect 
of the amendment, “[t]here is preserved in full the right of persons 
imprisoned under judgments of state and federal courts to ask release on 
the ground that they have been denied the sort of trial guaranteed by the 
Constitution; but effective provision is made against the unseemly 
incidents which have arisen in the assertion of the right. . . . [T]here 
should be no more cases where proceedings of state courts, affirmed by 
the highest courts of the state, with denial of certiorari by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, will be reviewed by federal circuit or district 
judges.”123  Parker did not state expressly that the amendment 
presupposed that Supreme Court denials of certiorari reflected the 
Justices’ view that the underlying claims were unmeritorious, but that is a 
fair inference from his statement that the amendment would avoid the 
“unseemly conflicts of jurisdiction which have arisen under recent habeas 
corpus decisions, without in anywise impairing the rights which it was the purpose 
of those decisions to protect.”124 
 The Court relied in part on this amendment, and quoted Judge 
Parker’s article at length, when it reversed Wade v. Mayo in Darr v. Burford 
and reimposed a rigid requirement of prior request for Supreme Court 
review via certiorari (in the absence of exceptional circumstances 
warranting a departure from the exhaustion requirement).125  Justice 
Reed’s opinion for the Court in Darr also explained in greater depth the 
theory underlying the rule.  Justice Reed quoted Brice v. Grice regarding the 
“exceedingly delicate jurisdiction” by which a single federal judge is 
 
121 Id. at 177. 
122 Id. at 178. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
125 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210–14 & n.34 (1950). 
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empowered to release a state prisoner,126 adding that: 
“The jurisdiction is more delicate, the reason against its exercise 
stronger, when a single judge is invoked to reverse the decision 
of the highest court of a State in which the constitutional rights 
of a prisoner could have been claimed.”127 
For this reason,  
It is this Court's conviction that orderly federal procedure under 
our dual system of government demands that the state's highest 
courts should ordinarily be subject to reversal only by this Court 
and that a state's system for the administration of justice should 
be condemned as constitutionally inadequate only by this 
Court.128 
 The Court further referred to “[t]he responsibility to intervene in state 
criminal matters,” which “rests primarily upon this Court.”129  State 
prisoners should be required to seek direct review because “[t]he 
opportunity to meet that constitutional responsibility should be 
afforded.”130  Justice Reed also referred to the Supreme Court’s “duty of 
passing upon charges of state violations of federal constitutional 
rights.”131  If the Justices have a “responsibility” and a “duty” to pass 
upon constitutional questions that arise in state criminal cases, and if that 
is the basis for limiting the discretion of the lower federal courts from 
doing so, then the Court’s disposition of petitions for certiorari by state 
prisoners must reflect the Justices’ views on the underlying merits of their 
claims. 
 By the time of Darr v. Burford, it is likely that these views were those 
of a minority of the Court.  Justice Reed purported to be leaving open the 
question of “what effect the lower federal courts should accord a denial 
of certiorari by this Court when the state prisoner later applies for federal 
habeas corpus.”132  Justice Frankfurter’s dissent understood Reed to be 
taking the position that the lower courts should treat a denial of certiorari 
as a decision on the merits.  His reading of Reed’s opinion was well 
 
126 Id. at 206 (1950) (quoting Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898)). 
127 Darr, 339 U.S. at 207 (quoting Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 187 (1899)). 
128Darr, 339 U.S. at 217.  See also id. at 216 (“It is this Court which ordinarily should 
reverse state court judgments concerning local criminal administration.”). 
129 Id. at 216. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
132 Id. at 214. 
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grounded, based on the excerpts from Reed’s opinion quoted above.  
Justice Reed’s denial of Frankfurter’s characterization of his views was 
only partial:  He conceded that a denial of certiorari might reflect doubts 
about whether the underlying decision rested on adequate state grounds, 
and he suggested that the lower courts should be free to reach the merits 
of the habeas petition when the Court includes “an express direction that 
the petitioner may proceed in the federal district court without prejudice 
from the denial of his petition for certiorari.”133  In the end, Reed 
purported to leave that question open.134   
But, more importantly, two members of the majority filed a 
concurring opinion indicating that they joined Justice Reed’s opinion 
“except for any indication it may contain that, although the reasons for a 
denial of certiorari are not stated, they nevertheless may be inferred from 
the record.”135  In the view of Justices Burton and Clark, “when the 
reasons for a denial of certiorari are not stated, the denial should be 
disregarded in passing upon a subsequent application for relief.”136  It 
thus appears that a majority of the Court (the four dissenters and the two 
concurring Justices) had by this time concluded that a denial of certiorari 
did not ordinarily reflect the view that the underlying claims were 
unmeritorious.  The views expressed by Justice Reed are nevertheless 
important – not because they reflect the views of a majority of the Court 
in 1950, but because they explain the rationale for the rule the Court 
adhered to until at least 1944. 
 In view of the concurring opinion of Burton and Clark, it is fair to 
infer that the views of a majority of the Court in 1950 regarding the 
meaning of a denial of certiorari filed by a state prisoner is reflected in 
Justice Frankfurter’s lengthy dissenting opinion in Darr.   Frankfurter 
explained that the majority’s principal error was to treat the writ of 
certiorari as if it served the same function as the writ of error, when in 
fact the two are very different:  
A writ of error was a writ of right. It makes all the difference in 
the world whether a prisoner knocks at the door of this Court 
to invoke its grace or has unquestioned access for the final 
determination of the federal question as to which the highest 
court of the State was merely an intermediate tribunal. . . . . In 
the writ of error cases this Court held habeas corpus in the 
lower federal courts ought not to take the place of a mandatory 
 
133 Id. at 215. 
134 Id. at 232. 
135 Id. at  219 (Burton & Clark, JJ., concurring). 
136 Id.  
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appeal. But this jurisdictional situation was drastically changed 
by the Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726, and the Act of 
February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936.  . . . After this shift from 
review as of right to review by grace, it could no longer be said 
that a litigant forwent his right to have this Court review, and 
reverse a State court. The right was gone.  Only an opportunity 
– and a slim one – remained. It completely misconceives the 
doctrine which required a case to be brought to this Court by 
writ of error, because it was the duty of this Court to 
adjudicate the claim on the merits, to apply it to the totally 
different factors involved in certiorari.137 
In arguing that state prisoners should not be required to seek certiorari 
before petitioning for habeas corpus, Frankfurter noted the variety 
reasons for denying certiorari, “which precludes the implication that were 
the case here the merits would go against the petitioner.”138  In Justice 
Frankfurter’s words: 
Petitions may have been denied because, even though serious 
constitutional questions were raised, it seemed to at least six 
members of the Court that the issue was either not ripe 
enough or too moribund for adjudication; that the question 
had better await the perspective of time or that time would 
soon bury the question or, for one reason or another, it was 
desirable to wait and see; or that the constitutional issue was 
entangled with nonconstitutional issues that raised 
doubt whether the constitutional issue could be effectively 
isolated;  or for various other reasons not relating to 
the merits.139 
This approach to certiorari, Frankfurter explained, was a necessary one.   
“It must be so unless the whole conception of certiorari in relation to the 
business of this Court is to be radically transformed.”  “The most weighty 
considerations of practical administration counsel against” requiring state 
prisoners to seek relief in the Supreme Court.140  Given the Court’s 
“increasing subjection of State convictions to federal judicial review 
through the expanded concept of due process” during the previous 
twenty years,141 and the resulting “flood of habeas corpus cases,”142 a 
 
137 Darr, 339 U.S. at 235 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
138 Id. at 227. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 229. 
141 Id. at 221. 
142 Id. at 235. 
	 6/20/16		10:34	AM	
134	 L A W 	 R E V I E W 	 [VOL.	__:_	
requirement that state prisoners seek relief in the Supreme Court would 
mean that “[t]he burden of the court’s volume of business will be greatly 
increased.”143 
      Additionally, for a variety of reasons, the district courts are better 
placed to address these claims than is the Supreme Court.  First, “cases 
involving federal claims by State prisoners . . . frequently involve 
questions of State law which must be answered before the federal issue 
can be reached,”144 and the district courts are better situated to address 
such issues.  Additionally, the Supreme Court “can dispose of [these 
cases] only as a matter of abstract pleading,” whereas “[t]he District 
Courts . . . can hold hearings when deemed appropriate, consider 
allegations on their merits if they are at all substantial and dispose of what 
often turn, out to be unmeritorious claims.”145  For all of these reasons,  
“[i]n the present context of the Court's business in relation to these cases 
– their volume and the required knowledge of local law with which the 
local federal judges are much more familiar than we can possibly be – all 
considerations of policy” support the conclusion that these cases belong 
in the district courts rather than the Supreme Court.146    
 In sum, Frankfurter’s dissent in Darr rests squarely on the 
recognition that the Supreme Court could no longer effectively monitor 
state court compliance with federal constitutional law in the “flood” of 
criminal appeals resulting from the expansion of the constitutional limits 
on state criminal proceedings, as well as on “policy” considerations 
making the lower federal courts the better forum for deciding these cases.  
Frankfurter’s arguments regarding the meaning of a denial of certiorari 
seem obvious to any observer of Supreme Court practice in 2016.  What 
is noteworthy, however, is that these views are being articulated in a 
dissenting opinion in 1950, thirty-four years after the shift from writ of 
error to certiorari review.  Although it is possible that these views  
commanded the support of a majority of the Court by this time, the 
Court appears to have arrived at the conclusions reached by Justice 
Frankfurter only gradually. 
 The question of the weight to be given by habeas courts to the 
Supreme Court’s prior denial of certiorari was finally settled three years 
later in Brown v. Allen.147  In holding that such denials should be given no 
 
143 Id. at 229. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 236. 
147 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507–08 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Darr’s 
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weight, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for a majority repeated some of the 
same arguments found in his Darr dissent, and he elaborated on the 
reasons making the district courts more appropriate fora than the 
Supreme Court for deciding these cases: 
These petitions for certiorari are rarely drawn by lawyers; some 
are almost unintelligible and certainly do not present a clear 
statement of issues necessary for our understanding, in view of 
the pressure of the Court's work. The certified records we have 
in the run of certiorari cases to assist understanding are almost 
unknown in this field.  Indeed, the number of cases in which 
most of the papers necessary to prove what happened in the 
State proceedings are not filed is striking. Whether there has been 
an adjudication or simply a perfunctory denial of a claim below is 
rarely ascertainable. Seldom do we have enough on which to base 
a solid conclusion as to the adequacy of the State adjudication. 
Even if we are told something about a trial of the claims the 
applicant asserts, we almost never have a transcript of these 
proceedings to assist us in determining whether the trial was 
adequate.  Equally unsatisfactory as a means for evaluating the 
State proceedings is the filing of opinions; in less than one-fourth 
of the cases is more than a perfunctory order of the State courts 
filed.148 
Thus, Brown reflects the Court’s preference for district courts over the 
Supreme Court on direct review as the forum for resolving these cases, a 
preference based on the Court’s view that the Court should be focusing 
on “questions of sufficient gravity,”149 as well as the burden that the 
“flood” of criminal cases would impose on the Court, and the fact that 
district courts are better situated to handle these cases for a number of 
reasons.  The Court’s well-known holding in Brown affirming the 
availability of de novo review of legal and mixed questions was directly 
tied to its largely forgotten holding that Supreme Court denials of 
certiorari were to be given no weight by the lower courts entertaining 
habeas corpus petitions. 
 In sum, even during the period between 1916 and 1953, the 
doctrine regarding the scope of habeas review in the lower federal courts 
served a forum-allocation function.  Limitations on the availability of 
habeas review in the lower federal courts were justified on the ground 
 
in the Supreme Court through certiorari was not reversed until 1963 in Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391 (1963). 
148 Brown, 344 U.S at 493–94. 
149 Id. at 491. 
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that it was the responsibility of the Supreme Court to exercise this 
“delicate jurisdiction.”  Recognition of the need for review of state 
convictions in some federal court was a constant; the debate was about 
which federal court should undertake such review.  The view that state 
prisoners should remain in custody without federal review of claimed 
constitutional errors in their convictions was not reflected in majority 
opinions during this era.   
III.  THE 1953-1996 PERIOD 
 Between its decision in Brown v. Allen and the enactment of AEDPA 
in 1996, the Supreme Court adhered to the view that de novo review was 
available on habeas for cognizable constitutional claims.  The Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts tightened the procedural requirements for obtaining 
habeas relief and placed some limits on the types of claims that could be 
the basis for habeas relief.  The new limits had a significant impact on the 
practical availability of habeas relief and were subjected to (mostly well 
deserved) criticism.  But, unlike the limits the Court held were imposed 
by AEDPA, the pre-AEDPA limits articulated by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts were largely consistent with the idea that state prisoners 
are entitled to a federal forum for the vindication of their constitutional 
rights.  Even during this period, the Court’s decisions reflected its view 
that federal review of state court decisions resulting in custody was 
necessary to protect the constitutional rights of state prisoners and to 
ensure that the state courts faithfully applied the Court’s constitutional 
precedents.   
 This section discusses two substantive limitations adopted by the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts and their compatibility with the notion that 
state prisoners are entitled to federal court review of constitutional issues 
decided against them by the state courts.  The two limitations are the 
exclusion of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims from the scope 
of habeas review and the exclusion of “new” rules not falling into one of 
two exceptions.   
1. Stone v. Powell and Errors Relating to Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule 
 In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that habeas relief would be 
unavailable for claimed errors by state courts in the application of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule unless the state did not “provid[e] a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate” the Fourth Amendment claim in its 
courts.”150  The Court thus adopted for habeas claims of Fourth 
Amendment error the standard that Professor Bator had advocated for all 
claims of constitutional error – a standard akin to that adopted in Williams 
 
150 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1975). 
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for all claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.  Stone thus appears 
to be an exception to the post-Brown rule that habeas is available for de 
novo federal review of constitutional issues decided by the state courts 
and resulting in custody. 
 On closer inspection, however, Stone is more a decision about the 
Exclusionary Rule than a decision about the scope of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction.  That is, at any rate, how the majority presented its holding.  
The Court stressed that prior decisions had “established that the 
[exclusionary] rule is not a personal constitutional right.”151  Rather, it is 
“a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect.”152  Given its prophylactic 
nature, the Court held, the rule should not be applicable in contexts in 
which its benefits are outweighed by its costs.  As support for this view, 
the Court cited prior decisions limiting the rule’s applicability, such as the 
exception permitting the admission of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment for purposes of impeachment153 and the rule’s 
“standing” limitation, permitting only the victim of the illegal search to 
invoke the exclusionary rule.154  The Court understood these decisions to 
establish a “balancing” test under which the exclusionary remedy is 
available in a given context only if the rule’s costs are outweighed by its 
benefits as a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations.155 
 To be sure, the majority’s application of the balancing test relied 
on certain assumptions about the reliability of state courts as enforcers of 
federal rights that, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, appear to 
contradict basic assumptions underlying the Court’s habeas jurisprudence.  
In a footnote, the majority noted its confidence in the state courts’ ability 
and willingness to enforce federal rights faithfully: “Despite differences in 
institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal 
constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling 
to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to 
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several 
States.”156  As Justice Brennan noted, this assumption flies in the face of 
prior statements by the Court that “‘habeas serves as a necessary 
additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to 
conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established 
 
151 Id. at 486. 
152 Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
153 Id. at 488. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 489. 
156 Id. at 495 n.35. 
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constitutional standards’” and that “the availability of collateral review 
assures ‘that the lower federal and state courts toe the constitutional 
line.’”157  Since the majority’s confidence in the lower courts extended to 
all “constitutional rights,” Justice Brennan feared that the Court’s holding 
portended a drastic narrowing of the availability of habeas review 
generally, or at least with respect to rules that, in the majority’s words, did 
not bear on the defendant’s guilt and hence on “the basic justice of [the 
prisoner’s] incarceration.158  
 In the end, the majority’s assumption about the reliability of state 
courts as enforcers of constitutional rights should not have led the court 
to conclude that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on habeas 
outweighed the benefits of doing so.   The main cost of the exclusionary 
rule, according to the majority, was that it “often frees the guilty.”159  
Against this cost, the majority weighed the “incremental deterrent effect” 
of applying the rule on habeas.  If the Court had compared the incremental 
costs of applying the rule on habeas with the incremental benefit of doing 
so, the Court would have found them to be congruent.  This would be so 
whether or not one believed that the state courts were reliable enforcers 
of federal rights. If the state courts are not reliable enforcers of federal 
rights, then the federal courts would be freeing the guilty, but that would 
be because the state courts were failing to apply the exclusionary rule 
faithfully.  On that assumption, application of the rule on habeas would 
be necessary as a deterrent.  If the state courts are reliable enforcer of the 
exclusionary rule, then the federal courts on habeas would not be freeing 
the guilty – by hypothesis, the state courts would be doing so.  Thus, the 
cost of applying the exclusionary rule on habeas would not be very 
high.160 
 Thus, the Court’s cost-benefit analysis was structurally flawed and, 
in any event, did not really turn on the court’s footnote assumption that 
state courts are reliable enforcers of constitutional rights.  The latter 
assumption might well have justified a broader narrowing of habeas, but 
the majority responded to Justice Brennan’s fear by describing it as 
“hyperbole” and by making clear that “[o]ur decision today is not 
concerned with the scope of the habeas statute as authority for litigating 
 
157 Id. at 520–21 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969))(Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 492 n.31. 
159 Id. at 490. 
160 One might conclude that, if state courts are reliable enforcers of the exclusionary 
rule, application of the exclusionary rule on federal habeas is costly from the standpoint of 
judicial efficiency, but that is not the sort of cost the Court relied upon in its opinion. 
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constitutional claims generally.”161  Indeed, Justice Powell, the author of 
Stone, subsequently affirmed his view that “[r]eview on habeas to 
determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the law in 
effect at the time of the conviction is . . .   required to ‘forc[e] trial and 
appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark.’”162  
 Instead, the majority in Stone made clear that its holding was based 
on the idea “that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather 
than a personal constitutional right” and on “the minimal utility of the 
rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas 
corpus proceeding.”163  Since, as noted, the reasoning that led the Court 
to the latter conclusion was fundamentally flawed, the most convincing 
explanation of the Court’s holding is that the Court did not regard the 
exclusionary rule as a constitutional right.  So understood, Stone v. Powell is a 
modified application of the established principle, also noted by the 
majority, that habeas relief is not available for claimed errors of non-
constitutional federal law unless “the alleged error constituted ‘a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of 
justice.’”164  If so, then Stone v. Powell is not in conflict with the 
proposition that state prisoners have a right to de novo review via habeas 
corpus of constitutional errors in their state court convictions. 
2. Teague v. Lane and “New” Rules of Constitutional Law 
 The Court adopted another substantive limit on the availability of 
habeas review in Teague v. Lane.  Teague was framed as a holding regarding 
the retroactive applicability of Supreme Court decisions recognizing 
“new” rules of constitutional law.  At one time, the Court permitted the 
articulation of “new” rules of constitutional law by the lower courts on 
habeas review, and the new rule was always applied in the case in which it 
was articulated.  The ‘retroactivity” issue would be addressed in a 
subsequent case and would be decided according to a multi-factor test 
that did not turn on whether the later case was pending on direct review 
at the time of the rule’s articulation or subsequently commenced on 
collateral review.165  In Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court held that new rules 
 
161 Id. at 495 n.37. 
162 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 653 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)). 
163 Powell, 428 U.S. at 494 n.37. 
164 Id. at 465 n.10 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974), which in 
turn quoted Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).  It is a modified application of 
the principle insofar as it leaves open the possibility of federal habeas relief for 
exclusionary rule claims if the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair 
litigation of the claim. 
165 FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1295.  
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must be applied to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new 
rule was announced.166  “[T]he Court's assertion of power to disregard 
current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the 
full course of appellate review is quite simply an assertion that our 
constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of 
legislation.”167    
Although Griffith’s reasoning seemed to deny the very concept of a 
“new” constitutional rule, in Teague the Court held that new constitutional 
rules should generally not be applied on collateral review.   In reaching 
this decision, the Court endorsed the view that "the threat of habeas 
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts 
throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent 
with established constitutional standards.”168  But, the Court wrote, “[i]n 
order to perform this deterrence function, . . . the habeas court need only 
apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original 
proceedings took place.”169  For this reason, the Court held, “new” 
constitutional rules should ordinarily not be applicable on federal habeas 
review.   
 The Court recognized two exceptions to this non-retroactivity rule.  
“First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places ‘certain kinds 
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe.’”170  The Court subsequently expanded 
this category to cover “not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of 
certain primary conduct, but also rules prohibiting a certain category of 
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or 
offense.”171  The second exception consists of constitutional decisions 
recognizing “new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished.”172  The Court in Teague thought it 
“unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to 
 
166 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
167 Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971)). 
168 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion)(quoting Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
169 Id. (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969)(Harlan, J., 
dissenting)).  The Court also quoted and endorsed Justice Powell’s statement from 
Stumes, quoted above, to the effect that habeas review is required to force the trial and 
appellate courts to “toe the constitutional mark.”  Id. (quoting Solum v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 
638, 653 (1984), which in turn quoted Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)). 
170 Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971)). 
171 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989). 
172 Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. 
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emerge,”173 and it has yet to find that a new constitutional rule falls in this 
category.  New rules that fall in either category are applicable retroactively 
to prisoners seeking collateral review, but otherwise habeas relief is 
available only for claims that the state court violated an “old” rule—i.e., 
one that had been articulated at the time his conviction became final. 
 In principle at least, the Teague doctrine is consistent with the 
proposition that state prisoners are entitled to de novo review of their 
constitutional claims.  Teague merely tells the habeas court what law they 
should apply in performing this de novo review.  The state court 
proceeding is to be tested against the law in effect at the time of the state 
proceeding.  Rules articulated by the Supreme Court after those 
proceedings are to be disregarded unless they fall within one of the two 
exceptions.  If the purpose of habeas review is to provide state courts 
with an incentive to apply federal law faithfully, this rule makes some 
sense.  After all, state trial and appellate judges cannot reasonably be 
expected to comply with constitutional principles not yet articulated.  The 
Teague rule also produces, again in principle, a sensible division of 
authority as between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.174  
Unless the claim falls within one of the two narrow exceptions the Court 
recognized, the role of the lower federal courts on habeas is to carry out 
the comparatively mundane role of ensuring state-court compliance with 
well-established constitutional rules.  The Supreme Court, in directly 
reviewing state court judgments of conviction, would retain the task of 
resolving unsettled questions of federal constitutional law arising in state 
criminal cases.  
 As applied, however, the Teague doctrine has been rightly criticized as 
giving state courts an insufficient incentive to apply federal precedents 
faithfully.175  The problem has primarily been the Court’s very broad 
interpretation of the concept of “new” law.  Moreover, the Court’s test 
for distinguishing old from new rules blurs the line between de novo and 
deferential review of state decisions.  The Court determines whether a 
claimed rule would be new and hence inapplicable on habeas by asking 
whether a reasonable jurist examining the extant precedents would 
conclude that the claimed rule was already established.176   
In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas (writing for himself and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) argued that this test effectively 
 
173 Id. 
174 That is, compared to AEDPA as interpreted in Williams. 
175 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1816–17 (1991). 
176 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992). 
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requires the habeas court to defer to the state court’s interpretation of the 
then-existing precedents.177  Justice O’Connor (Teague’s author) disagreed: 
Teague did not establish a “deferential” standard of review of state 
court determinations of federal law. It did not establish a 
standard of review at all. Instead, Teague simply requires that a 
state conviction on federal habeas be judged according to the law 
in existence when the conviction became final. In Teague, we 
refused to give state prisoners the retroactive benefit of new rules 
of law, but we did not create any deferential standard of review 
with regard to old rules.178 
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice O’Connor: 
Teague did not establish a deferential standard of review of 
state-court decisions of federal law. It established instead a 
principle of retroactivity. . . . To be sure, the fact that our 
standard for distinguishing old rules from new ones turns on 
the reasonableness of a state court’s interpretation of then 
existing precedents suggests that federal courts do in one 
sense defer to state-court determinations. But we should not 
lose sight of the purpose of the reasonableness inquiry where 
a Teague issue is raised: The purpose is to determine whether 
application of a new rule would upset a conviction that was 
obtained in accordance with the constitutional 
interpretations existing at the time of the prisoner’s 
conviction.179 
In sum, Teague retained de novo habeas corpus review for “old” rules.   
Although  Justice Thomas lost the battle in Wright v. West, he may 
have won the war.  Justices O’Connor and Kennedy made clear in Wright 
that Teague had not mandated deferential review of “old” constitutional 
claims on habeas.  In Williams, however, these Justices joined Justice 
Thomas and the two other Justices who had joined his opinion in 
concluding that Congress, in enacting AEDPA, had displaced de novo 
review of old claims that had been adjudicated on the merits in state 
court, imposing the deferential standard of review that Justice Thomas 
had mistakenly believed had been established by Teague.    
 
The Court in Williams did not discuss whether the denial of habeas 
relief for wrong but reasonable errors would affect its approach to 
 
177  Id. 
178 Id. at 303–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
179 Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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certiorari petitions of persons convicted in state court who would no 
longer be able to obtain relief from the lower federal courts on habeas.  
As this Essay has shown, state prisoners had always had access to federal 
review of errors of federal constitutional law and of mixed questions from 
either the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts.  Between 1916 and 
1953, the responsibility for providing such review shifted from the 
Supreme Court to the lower federal courts as the Court came to realize 
that it could no longer hope to fulfill an error-correction role.  Between 
1953 and 1996, the Court cut back on habeas relief in certain respects but 
maintained the de novo standard of review in habeas cases, believing that 
such review provided “a necessary additional incentive for trial and 
appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a 
manner consistent with established constitutional standards.”180  If the 
Court still believes that such an incentive is necessary, it will need to 
rethink its current approach to certiorari petitions by state prisoners 
whose access to the habeas relief has been curtailed by AEDPA, as the 
Court interpreted the statute in Williams.  Just as habeas has always served 
a forum-allocation function, Williams may require the Court to understand 
AEDPA as a forum allocation rule.  The Court will need to consider 
whether Congress in enacting AEDPA meant, improbably, to reestablish 
the regime for reviewing state court criminal convictions that the Court 
emphatically rejected in 1953.181 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of federal habeas relief available to state prisoners in the 
years before Brown v. Allen was decided in 1953 is a famously disputed 
question – a question of recognized importance to current debates about 
the proper scope of habeas relief.  This Essay has shown that the 
available scope of habeas relief has always been directly linked to the 
effective availability of direct review of state criminal convictions in the 
Supreme Court.  The need for federal review of issues of constitutional 
law and of application of such law to fact decided against criminal 
defendants in the state courts has always been recognized.  Only the 
forum affording such review has changed.  Between 1789 and 1916, state 
criminal defendants were entitled to review of such issues in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.   Between 1953 and 1996, de novo review of such issues 
was available in the lower federal courts via habeas.  The period between 
1916 and 1953 was a transitional period marked by disagreement among 
the Justices as to the proper federal forum for providing such review.  At 
first, a majority of the Court continued to regard the Supreme Court as 
 
180 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion)(quoting Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
181 I consider this question in Vázquez, supra note 14. 
	 6/20/16		10:34	AM	
144	 L A W 	 R E V I E W 	 [VOL.	__:_	
the proper forum for the sensitive task of reviewing and possibly 
reversing state court criminal judgments that had been affirmed by the 
highest state courts.  Gradually, the Court came to recognize that it could 
not hope to fulfill an error-correction function in such cases.  The Court 
thus made clear in Brown v. Allen both that the Court’s denials of certiorari 
petitions filed by state prisoners should not be regarded as reflecting its 
views on the merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claims and that the 
habeas courts should review de novo the issues of federal constitutional 
law and of application of such law to fact decided against the prisoner by 










Table 1.  The number of requests for review filed in the U.S. 
Supreme Court between 1916 and 1953 by persons convicted of 






















1916 7 1 1 
1917 8 3 3 
1918 7 3 3 
1919 4 2 2 
1920 9 3 3 
1921 7 2 2 
1922 9 2 2 
1923 6 3 3 
 
* A search for petitions for writ of error and petitions for writ of certiorari from 1916-
1953 was conducted through the Gale Cengage Learning’s digital collection, The Making of 
Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832-1978.  Following the selection of the 
petitions filed by persons convicted of crimes in state court, a search for the decisions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court for each of those cases was conducted through the 
WestlawNext’s database, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, whose coverage begins in 1790.  Each 
case was recorded with its filing year, name, citation, type of petition, and decision of the 
Court.  The number of requests filed by each petition type and the number of petitions in 
which the Court denied certiorari for each year were then determined based on the 
collected data. 
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1924 9 1 1 
1925 12 5 5 
1926 21 3 3 
1927 10 3 3 
1928 3 11 11 
1929 3 8 8 
1930 7 3 3 
1931 1 8 7 
1932 1 2 1 
1933 3 13 9 
1934 2 10 7 
1935 3 10 8 
1936 4 12 11 
1937 2 8 7 
1938 3 7 6 
1939 2 16 11 
1940 2 23 20 
1941 1 22 18 
1942 4 22 18 
1943 1 24 22 
1944 0 25 22 
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1945 2 23 20 
1946 3 33 26 
1947 2 33 24 
1948 1 41 33 
1949 0 38 36 
1950 0 28 21 
1951 0 34 26 
1952 0 44 38 
1953 2 39 37 
 
 
